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the transportation network, a variable cost of commodity transport, and
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prices and quantities. This is among the 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1 Introduction
This work will attempt to address some of the classic, but relatively unex-
plored, questions raised in urban economics that deal with the economics of
cities. Our questions include the following. Why do cities form where they
do? What are the driving forces behind the formation of cities? What roles do
increasing returns, gains to trade and the location of marketplaces play? What
role does the location of rms play? Is market failure necessary for agglomer-
ation? Is perfect competition consistent with spatial modeling? Why do some
cities grow faster than others? This set of questions frames our line of research.
The answers to these questions have important policy implications, since the
predictability of the e¤ects of government actions rests on an understanding
of the mechanisms driving the urban economy. The ability of policy makers
to make informed decisions about contemporary issues such as government
policy pertaining to migration to and from cities, or social policy directed at
revitalizing cities, relies on information provided by urban economic theory.
In order to have a theory explaining city formation and structure, it is
necessary to construct a class of models in which the locations of all agents are
endogenous, including both consumers and rms. As explained in Berliant and
ten Raa (1994), the nature of most of the existing literature is partial rather
than general equilibrium in the sense that either the locations of consumers or
rms are xed. The literature reviewed here is distinct since the locations of
all agents are endogenous, and thus these models have the potential to answer
the questions we have posed.
There are many approaches to answering the questions addressed by our
model that generally suggest di¤erent economic causes for city formation and
growth, and consequently di¤erent modeling strategies. Each theory relies
on di¤erent forces to explain agglomeration and therefore has di¤erent conse-
quences in terms of welfare. So it is important to generate testable hypotheses
to distinguish among the theories. We categorize the literature on city for-
mation into four groups, using the Spatial Impossibility Theorem of Starrett
(1978), as interpreted in Fujita (1986) and Fujita and Thisse (2002), which
states that there is no spatial equilibrium with agglomeration if the follow-
ing conditions are met: (i) no relocation cost, (ii) consumerspreferences and
rmstechnologies are independent of location, (iii) the economy is closed, (iv)
each location has complete competitive markets. Each of the four groups ex-
plains agglomeration by relaxing at least one of the hypotheses of the Starrett
Theorem.
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In the rst group, city formation is explained using increasing returns to
scale. This group violates (iv) since it assumes imperfect competition. Indeed,
Fujita and Krugman (1995, 2000), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) and
Krugman (1991, 1993a, 1993b) use a Dixit-Stiglitz framework and increasing
returns to generate city formation in a monopolistic competition context.1
This work was preceded by Fujita (1988), Abdel-Rahman (1988, 1990) and
Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990).
The second group of models uses spatial externalities to explain city for-
mation (Beckmann (1977), Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Papageorgiou and Smith
(1983), ten Raa (1984)). These models violate (ii), (iv) or both, since agent
utilities or production functions depend on the locations of the other agents
and these externalities are not priced.
In the third group, agglomeration is explained by strategic interactions be-
tween rms (spatial competition a la Hotelling; for surveys see Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1986, 1992)). This group also violates (iv) since it assumes imperfect
competition.
The fourth group of models (Berliant and Konishi (2000), Berliant and
Wang (1993), Wang (1990)) uses gains to trade and setup costs of marketplaces
and transportation networks to generate agglomeration. This group violates
(ii) and (iv), since there may be no marketplace (and consequently no market)
at some locations, and therefore agents care about location.
Another explanation for city formation is the di¤erentiation of labor. For
example, Rochester, NY, has a highly specialized labor force that serves com-
panies such as Kodak, Xerox, and Bausch and Lomb. These companies employ
workers who know about optics and engineering. Another example is Silicon
Valley, that has a concentration of labor specialized in the production of semi-
conductors. This idea has not been modelled formally, although some attempts
have been made to model the worker choice of human capital investment us-
ing very crude spatial structures (Baumgardner (1988), Benabou (1993), Kim
(1991)). Zenou (2009) surveys this literature and studies labor markets in
various imperfect competition or search contexts.
The specic question we address in the present paper is: How does labor
di¤erentiation a¤ect city structure?
In our approach (which can be considered as a fth group), the formation
1Kim (1995) provides some empirical evidence on regional concentration or specialization
of industrial production in the United States. For the data from the 1920s to the present,
this evidence seem to contradict the empirical implications of the monopolistic competition
models.
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of cities is explained by labor di¤erentiation, gains to trade, a xed cost for
the transportation network, a variable cost of commodity transport, and the
commuting costs of consumers. Since rms are used as marketplaces, our
model violates (ii) and (iv) of the Starrett Theorem, similar to the fourth
group above.
Observe that in all models of general equilibrium with endogenous locations
(including ours), the main problem is to show the existence of a spatial equilib-
rium and to nd its determinacy properties. Why is this a problem? When one
introduces space in a general equilibrium framework with a continuum of con-
sumers (and locations) and a nite number of rms, there are non-convexities
for both consumers (the consumption set and preferences are non-convex due
to the discrete choice of one location of residence) and rms (rm reaction
correspondences are not convex valued since given prices, a rms prot could
be maximized at two di¤erent locations), and therefore the usual xed point
theorems relevant for proving existence of an equilibrium do not work.
On the consumer side, we can easily convexify the aggregate demand cor-
respondence with a large number of individuals (see Hildenbrand (1974)).
Schweizer, Varaiya and Hartwick (1976), Ellickson (1979), and Grimaud and
La¤ont (1989) have used this technique to prove the existence of a spatial
equilibrium. Observe that the number of locations in all of this work is nite.
In contrast, our model as well as the standard models of location theory use
a continuum of locations. In this case, Hildenbrands type of argument does
not necessarily apply. As is common in the literature (see Fujita (1989)), we
use the bid rent approach, imposing the condition that consumers can choose
only one location, to solve the non-convexity problem; this technique does not
require a xed point argument or convexity, but relies on direct calculations.
How can we solve the rms non-convexity problem? To the best of our
knowledge, there are two techniques that work. Both of them x producer
locations and solutions are computed for non-location variables given these lo-
cations. The two techniques use di¤erent methods of xing producer locations.
The rst uses Negishis (1960) method, that xes rms at the Pareto optimal
locations and more generally xes the allocation at the Pareto optimum. Then
one has to decentralize, and nd a price system that supports the optimum
(see Wang (1990), Berliant and Wang (1993)). Obviously, this method does
not work if there is a market failure. The second technique consists of char-
acterizing the spatial equilibrium. However, since there is in general a lot of
endogenous variables (prices and quantities as usual, but also locations of pro-
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ducers and consumers), the characterization of equilibrium is di¢ cult. This
method was used by Fujita and Krugman (1995, 2000) and in order to charac-
terize the equilibrium they resort to specic functional forms (e.g. CES utility
functions and a Samuelsonian icebergtransport technology). This approach
su¤ers from a lack of robustness in the specication of functional forms as
well as from a large indeterminacy in the number and qualitative properties of
equilibrium. They select one equilibrium. Moreover, consumer commuting is
not allowed by this type of model. In our approach, we also use the (second)
technique of calculating the equilibrium directly, but we avoid the problems
encountered by Fujita and Krugman (1995, 2000). In essence, due to the in-
teraction of rms, considered to be marketplaces as well for exchanging goods,
we are able to characterize their equilibrium locations in general, and therefore
to prove existence of equilibrium by employing a xed point argument for all
of the non-locational variables.
A natural question that comes to mind is why, in a model of general equilib-
rium with endogenous locations (such as ours), does one not use randomized
strategies to alleviate the non-convexity problem and to prove existence of
an equilibrium? Basically, there are two reasons not to use mixed strategies.
First, if one studies what happens after a randomization is realized, one can
easily end up at an infeasible allocation. For example, each rm randomizes
over all possible parcels ex ante, but ex post, rms might happen to pile up on
one interval, an ex post infeasible allocation. Mixed strategies also involve pre-
commitment of rms to the parcels they get after randomization, and when
the random draw is realized, they might have more prots with a di¤erent
strategy. The latter e¤ect is common to games allowing mixed strategies.
The second, and perhaps more important reason, is that the obvious equi-
librium with mixed strategies is where everyone is spread out uniformly by
randomizing over all locations: it is the Starrett theorem in the context of
randomization. Such an allocation clearly minimizes transport costs. There
is no agglomeration, and it is uninteresting just as in the standard Starrett
theorem. Equilibrium is an artefact of randomization. This is very similar to
what is proposed in Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) as the solution where
there is no equilibrium in their quadratic assignment model, and should be
rejected for the same reasons.
To be more precise, our model uses a very general setting, allowing a multi-
dimensional location space and multiple rms using di¤erent types of labor to
produce di¤erent output commodities. Locations of all agents are endogenous
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as are prices and quantities. Firms anticipate the relocation of consumers,
but inuence land prices through their location decisions. As we shall ex-
plain shortly, we stick as close to perfect competition as possible while retain-
ing existence of equilibrium. Firms use compact, convex sets of land while
consumers buy densities of land. It is assumed that each rm can use only
one type of labor and produce only one type of output. With reference to
the labor economics literature, labor di¤erentiation can be viewed either as
general or specic human capital depending on the number of rms using a
particular type of labor. Within this framework, we characterize the spatial
conguration of rms in equilibrium. Firms are adjacent to each other at any
equilibrium allocation. This is very similar to the principle of minimum di¤er-
entiation although the force that is driving agglomeration in our model is the
transportation cost of outputs. This result is used to prove existence and to
examine the determinacy of equilibrium. The proof of existence is unusual in
that it uses a mixture of bid rent and xed point techniques. Concerning the
determinacy analysis, we use di¤erential topology techniques in combination
with the bid rent approach. This paper can be counted among the rst appli-
cations of smooth economy techniques to urban economics. To our knowledge,
Berliant and Kung (2006, 2009) are the only predecessors, and they apply these
techniques to New Economic Geography models.
We show that whether or not equilibrium exists and whether or not it is
locally unique depend crucially on the relative numbers of outputs, types of
labor and rms. The multiplicity of equilibria is positively associated with
the degree of labor di¤erentiation. Finally, an equilibrium is not necessarily
Pareto optimal in this model.
Loosely speaking, our main conclusion is as follows. When labor is not
completely di¤erentiated, in the sense that more than one rm is drawing from
the same pool of labor, equilibrium might not exist; a counterexample (Ex-
ample 4) is provided in the Appendix. (This does not exclude existence of
equilibrium for other examples.) Once one has su¢ cient conditions on labor
di¤erentiation for existence of equilibrium, generically there is a continuum of
equilibria. This derives from the classical idea that indivisibilities, particu-
larly in the order and location of rms in our model, both inhibits existence
of equilibrium and, once equilibrium is found, allows variation in continuous
endogenous parameters without altering the order of rms and without de-
stroying equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
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the model and provides the notation and basic denitions. In section 3, we
characterize the locations of rms and consumers in equilibrium. It is unusual
to be able to do this analytically. Section 4 examines the determinacy of
equilibrium in this model. For given values of the exogenous parameters, we
nd that, depending on the number of labor types, rms and output goods, the
set of equilibria might be empty, might be nite or might form a continuum.
Section 5 provides su¢ cient conditions for existence of an equilibrium in the
model. These conditions, in turn, imply that generically the set of equilibria
forms a continuum. In section 6, we give an example showing that both welfare
theorems can fail. Section 7 concludes. An Appendix, available at the rst
authors web site, contains complementary illustrative examples and all proofs.
2 The general setting
The location space Z is a compact, convex subset of the Euclidean space <K .2
Land of density 1 is available in all locations in Z. There are V types of
labor, v = 1; :::; V . Each consumer is classied in one category of labor. This
could, for example, be derived from the endogenous choice of human capital by
consumers as in Rosen (1983), Kim (1989) or Baumgardner (1988). However,
here we assume that labor heterogeneity is exogenous. There are s = 1; :::; S
goods and each rm produces only one type of good s. Each worker of a
given type has the same utility function and is endowed with one unit of
labor but no consumption commodities. N v is the measure of consumers who
supply labor of type v. Each individual3 of type v chooses location z 2 Z,
land consumption qv(z) (where q(z) = [q1(z); :::; qV (z)]), consumption good
quantities Xvs (z) in order to maximize utility U
v(qv(z); Xv(z)), where Xv(z)
is the vector [Xv1 (z); :::; X
v
S(z)] and X(z) = [X
1(z); :::; XV (z)], under a budget
constraint that will be given later. The consumption set of each consumer
is the positive orthant of <s+1. We assume that utility is strictly monotonic
in all arguments and represents Cr di¤erentiably strictly convex preferences
(see Mas-Colell (1985, ch. 2.6)). We also assume that for any q > 0, X > 0,
U v(q;X) > 0 = U v(0; X) = U v(q; 0) = U v(0; 0), so any consumption (q;X)
with q and X strictly positive yields higher utility than any consumption on
the boundary of <s+1+ . For simplicity, there is no disutility from labor.
Each rm uses only one type of labor, along with land, to produce exactly
2Typically, K = 1 or 2. With multi-story buildings, K = 3.
3In our notation, superscripts represent agents and subscripts represent commodities.
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one output commodity. For each s = 1; :::; S and v = 1; :::; V , there are M vs
rms producing type s commodity with type v labor, where Li;vs , Q
i;v
s and Y
i;v
s
are respectively the labor, the land input and the output of rm i producing
good s using type v labor. Each rm is thus characterized by a triple (i; s; v).
Here the index i runs from 1 to M vs . Dene the following vectors: L
v
s =
[L1;vs ; :::; L
Mvs ;v
s ], Ls = [L1s; :::; L
V
s ], L = [L1; :::; LS], Q
v
s = [Q
1;v
s ; :::; Q
Mvs ;v
s ], Qs =
[Q1s; :::; Q
V
s ], Q = [Q1; :::; QS], Y
v
s = [Y
1;v
s ; :::; Y
Mvs ;v
s ], Ys = [Y 1s ; :::; Y
V
s ], Y =
[Y1; :::; YS]. The production function for rm (i; s; v) is given by f vs (L
i;v
s ; Q
i;v
s ) =
Y i;vs . Firms using the same type of labor to produce the same commodity are
identical. We assume that f vs () is Crwith strictly positive derivatives on <2++,
that D2f vs is negative denite, and that f
v
s (L
i;v
s ; 0) = 0.
Assuming constant returns to scale would not change the basic results but
would change supply functions to correspondences, and this would make the
di¤erential topology argument used for the determinacy of equilibrium much
more di¢ cult.
In our model, absentee landlords are endowed with all of the land and all
of the prot shares but consume only produced goods. It is standard in the
literature of urban economics to employ absentee landlords to insulate the
model from income e¤ects in order to use a bid rent approach (see e.g. Fujita
(1989)). Our results are easily generalized to allow consumers to be endowed
with land or prot shares.4 We can also allow absentee shareholders (as
distinct from landlords) to have all the prot shares.
We assume that the market for all goods (including labor) except land are
competitive. This assumption of perfectly competitive markets will be made
formal in the statements of the consumer and producer optimization problems,
and is important in order to prove that equilibrium exists. As we will see later,
whatever the assumption on the transportation cost of goods, it is this assump-
tion of perfect competition that makes good prices location-independent. We
will discuss later the assumption that the land market is not competitive.
Consumers of type v purchase a density of land qv(z), whereas rms will use
an area of land. Let  be Lebesgue measure on measurable subsets of <k. All
measure theoretic statements (such as almost surely) are made with respect
to this measure. Let d be a metric on <k. For any Lebesgue measurable A
4For that, one must include this extra revenue in the consumer budget constraint and
skip the analysis of the absentee landlord. This is called the public ownership model (see
Fujita (1989, ch.3)).
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and any  > 0, dene
B(A) = fz 2 Z j inf
y2A
d(y; z)  g and
g(A; ) = (B(A)).
Firms use Lebesgue measurable subsets of Z as inputs for production. Let C
be any collection of Lebesgue measurable subsets of Z satisfying the following
conditions:
(a) For each A 2 C there is a  > 0 such that B(A) 2 C 8 2 [0; )
and g(A; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable on [0; ).5
(b) Fix any C1;11 ; :::; C
Mvs ;V
S 2 C. If some rm is using a positive
quantity of land, then there exists a (possibly di¤erent) rm (i; s; v) with
(Ci;vs ) > 0 such that for every 
0 > 0 there is an A 2 C, A  Ci;vs a.s.
with (Ci;vs )  0 < (A) < (Ci;vs ) and
inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk = inf
x2A
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk
for s0 = 1; ::; S; v0 = 1; :::; V ; j = 1; :::;M vs ;8(j; s0; v0) 6= (i; s; v)
For instance, if Z = [0; 1]K , the hyper-rectangles of the form [; ][0; 1]K 1
aligned parallel to the axes in <K used below will satisfy these conditions, as
will many other collections. For assumption (b), the rm parcel that contracts
is one at the edge of the economy. The idea behind this assumption is that
small expansions and contractions of parcels are possible, so calculus can be
used. Cantor sets violate this assumption.
If rm i producing good s and using type v labor chooses a Ci;vs 2 C, then
Qi;vs = (C
i;v
s ).
Consumers pay a commuting cost to travel to work. For simplicity, com-
muting costs are only monetary costs and therefore there is no time cost of
commuting. Let t denote the vector of input requirements for one unit of
commuting distance, so the cost per unit is p(i; s; v)  t (where p(i; s; v) is the
vector of prices of the output goods, p(i; s; v) 2 <s+, t 2 <s). Observe that
p(i; s; v) is a price vector at a rm-market place so prices are rm (and hence
location) dependent. Consumers of type v are employed only by rms using
type v labor.
5It is easy to verify that this assumption holds for intervals when K = 1. It also holds
when K = 2 and a parcel is a disk, and when K = 3 and a parcel is a sphere. Many
other shapes can be accommodated as well. General metrics are employed here because,
for instance, the sup norm metric is useful for squares.
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We assume that every pair of rms must be connected by a transport net-
work (the cost of connecting any pair of rms is shared equally by each mem-
ber of the pair) and that all consumers purchase their consumption goods at
the location of a rm, i.e. rms are marketplaces.6 These assumptions mean
that transportation of goods takes place only between rms, where consumers
purchase all their consumption commodities. The transportation network for
commodities will connect all rms, even those producing the same good, since
local demand and supply of consumption commodities might not be balanced.
In the model, all markets are spatially global, but labor markets can di¤er due
to labor heterogeneity. Variable transport cost can create di¤erences in the
price of a consumption good across locations and rms. That is the reason
p(i; s; v) is indexed by rm. Later, we shall argue that competition forces p
to be constant across rms and hence locations. Observe that the reason that
goods must be transported among rms, and the reason that rms must pay a
xed and variable transportation cost, is that consumers use the rms as mar-
ketplaces and, due to the boundary condition on preferences, want some of all
of the goods.
More formally, let  2 <s denote the vector of marginal physical require-
ments for setting up half of a transportation network between two rms, so
the cost per unit of distance to rm (i; s; v) is p(i; s; v)   . This is a xed cost
independent of volume. Next we specify variable costs.
Let g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0) represent the vector of net shipments of consumption goods
between two rms and let T be a non-negative S  S matrix. Row s of
the matrix T gives the cost in terms of the S consumption goods (per unit
of distance) of shipping one unit of consumption good s to or from a rm. A
diagonal non-negative matrix with entries less than 1 would be a Samuelsonian
icebergtransport technology.
Our assumption about the cost sharing rule means that this rule is essen-
tially equal division of the network transportation cost for connecting each
rm to another. However, our results can be extended to arbitrary monotonic
and lower semi-continuous functions of this xed cost. Relocation costs for
both rms and consumers are zero.
We could employ a more general transportation technology as in Berliant
and Konishi (2000) which would specify a set of input requirements, each ele-
ment of which can produce one unit of transportation services. For simplicity,
6An alternative is to model marketplace structure as a public good for consumers; see
Berliant and Konishi (2000).
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we use the special case given above. The use of a more general technology will
not a¤ect the main results, as we shall explain in section 3 below. Let us now
dene two important concepts.
Denition 1 Firm (i; s; v) and rm (j; s0; v0) are adjacent if
inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk = 0:
Denition 2 Firm (i; s; v) and rm (j; s0; v0) are connected if there is a list
of rms such that rm i is the rst on the list and rm j is the last on the list
and each rm is adjacent to its predecessor and successor on the list.
We assume no transport cost between adjacent rms. This implies no
transport costs between connected rms, because otherwise rms would simply
ship to adjacent rms, and those rms would re-ship to the next rm. Thus,
zero transport costs between adjacent rms actually implies zero transport costs
among connected rms. Hence, we state the total cost for rm (i; s; v) of a
transportation network between rms as follows:
SX
s0=1
VX
v0=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
p(i; s; v)  [ + T  g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0)] inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
where IX is the indicator function of the event X and X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0) = fFirm (i; s; v)
is not connected to rm (j; s0; v0)g. Notice that we separate the last two parts
of this expression, since rms that are connected are not necessarily adjacent.
Observe that even when rms are connected, commuting distance and thus
commuting cost of a worker to various rms is not the same.
Let 	 be the constant (over location) unit price of land to rms. The
idea that this must be constant will be explained after the statement of the
rms optimization problem. Firm (i; s; v) maximizes its prot vs (rms using
the same input v and output s are identical) by solving the following problem,
taking as given the locations of other rms. To give meaning to other rms
choices, let C (i;s;v)s =
h
C1;11 ; :::; C
i 1;v
s ; C
i+1;v
s ; :::; C
MVS ;V
S
i
: Ci;vs 2 C represents
the choice of parcel. For now, we take good shipments g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0) to be exoge-
nous, but shortly we shall see that T can be taken to be zero without loss of
generality, so g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0) is immaterial.
max
Li;vs ;C
i;v
s
vs(L
i;v
s ; C
i;v
s ; C
 (i;s;v)
s ) (1)
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where
vs(L
i;v
s ; C
i;v
s ; C
 (i;s;v)
s ) = ps(i; s; v) f
v
s (L
i;v
s ; (C
i;v
s ))  wvLi;vs   (Ci;vs )	
 
SX
s0=1
VX
v0=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
p(i; s; v)  [ + T  g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0)] inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
:
Notice that a rm does not think that changing its location will a¤ect its
unit price of land 	 or any other price.
Observe that the prot function depends on the location of rm (i; s; v)
and the locations of all other rms through the fourth term of the RHS of (1).
This is the Nash assumption about equilibrium. When a rm moves, it takes
as given the locations of other rms. Here, in terms of location, consumers are
behaving competitively whereas rm behavior is Nash. The concept of equilib-
rium we have here is a sort of a combination of the ones introduced by Fujita
and Thisse (1986) and Anderson and Engers (1994). Indeed, in the rst paper
a land market is considered in the Hotelling model and the authors introduce
the possibility of workersrelocation in reaction to rmslocation decisions.
Thus, consumers are the followers in a Stackelberg game where rms are the
leaders. In the second paper, rms are price-taking but have Nash behavior in
location; consumer locations are xed. It is important to highlight here that
our concept of equilibrium is Nash in location but rms take all prices (good
prices as well as wages) as given. In other words, each rm moves, taking
prices and the location of other rms as given.
Observe moreover that, when a rm changes its location and locates farther
away from other rms, this rm might think that its variable transportation
cost will go up but, since it is competitive (in the product market), it thinks
its output price wont change. Therefore, even with the assumption of positive
variable transportation costs, good prices are not location dependent.
This implies location-independent (good and labor) prices. Thus, we have
a constant wage gradient, which is just a special case of allowing wages to vary
across locations. If wages are allowed to vary across rm locations but agents
take the wage gradient as parametric, we would simply have more equilibria.
Furthermore, if wages vary with residential distance from a rm, this is a form
of price discrimination and seems to be incompatible with perfect competition.
In this case, it is unclear what rms think wages would be if they move.
Moreover, it seems unrealistic to assume that rms wage-discriminate based
on the residence locations of worker/consumers.
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There are several alternative equilibrium concepts that could be used with
this model. We use the simplest, namely perfect competition, taking prices and
the actions of other agents as given, with one small deviation. We assume that
the price of land faced by rms is constant across locations. An implication is
that it is independent of consumer bid-rent or the unit price of land paid by
consumers. Another implication is that, in equilibrium, the price of land faced
by rms will be at least as high as the maximal bid-rent of consumers.
There are two reasons we make this assumption. First, the rms know that
if they relocate, consumers will follow and bid up the price of land nearby.
Although it would be best to model this process explicitly, the resulting model
would be very complex and di¢ cult to analyze. In particular, non-convexities
in reaction correspondences of rms would make the analysis attempted here
impossible. Instead, we model this process implicitly through a constant price
of land for rms.
Second, it is clear that at any possible equilibrium allocation, the bid-
rent curves of consumers are highest near a rm and decline with distance
from a rm. If rms pay the price given by the highest bid rent for parcels
and have location-independent production functions, they will always want to
locate where rent is lowest, namely as far away from their current location as
possible. Such behavior is unlikely to lead to an equilibrium.
Perhaps the most natural alternative equilibrium concept is as follows.
There are two stages, and the solution concept is pure strategy subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium. The second stage is an equilibrium under perfect com-
petition given xed rm parcels. The rst stage is a simultaneous move Nash
equilibrium with rms choosing the parcels that they will use in production
and will rent in the second stage. The rms know perfectly how their choice
of parcel in the rst stage will a¤ect equilibrium in the second stage, including
their land rent and the value of their output.
Although this equilibrium concept has intuitive appeal, there are three seri-
ous technical problems associated with it. First, the second stage competitive
equilibrium will not be unique in general. This presents problems for both re-
sults concerning existence of equilibrium and determinacy of equilibrium. Of
course, multiple equilibria in the second stage can cause non-convexities in (or
an ill-dened) rst stage reaction correspondence. Possible remedies include
using mixed strategies in the rst stage, rening second stage equilibria so that
they are unique, or imposing conditions on the economy so that second stage
equilibria are unique. Any of these solutions will either complicate matters or
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limit the robustness of results substantially.
The second technical problem is that rms might not be connected in an
equilibrium. Prices of mobile goods in the second stage can di¤er across lo-
cations, rendering the equilibrium concept very complex. Non-convexities in
rst stage rm reaction correspondences can result. Moreover, the arguments
we use for existence of an equilibrium and determinacy properties would no
longer work, since they take as given the locations of rms.
The third technical problem with the alternative equilibrium concept is that
if rms in the rst stage choose a disequilibrium conguration, for example if
two rms decide to use the same parcel of land, then payo¤s are not well-
dened. The reason is that given such rm location choices, the second stage
conguration of rms is not feasible, so there is no competitive equilibrium
associated with it.
For these reasons, we use the rst equilibrium concept, employing (virtu-
ally) perfect competition. This can be seen as a special case of the alternative
equilibrium concept, where the transport cost faced by rms is much larger
than the commuting cost faced by consumers, so that rms will always choose
to form a connected set in equilibrium.
Let us turn to the consumers problem. A consumer of type v performs
the following optimization program taking as given prices, p = [p1; :::; pS], the
wage rate, wv, the integrable land rent, 	 : Z ! <+, and the location of all
rms where Cvs = [C
1;v
s ; :::; C
Mvs ;v
s ], Cs = [C1s ; :::; C
V
s ], C
v = [Cv1 ; :::; C
v
S] and
C = [C1; :::; CS].
max
Xv ;qv ;z
U v(qv; Xv) (2)
s:t: p Xv + qv	(z) + p  t inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk = wv
Observe that there is only one wage for each labor type since consumers are
mobile and one unit of labor is supplied inelastically by each consumer. Dene
w = [w1; :::; wV ].
Let us denote by Ri;vs = fz 2 Z j i; s 2 argmin
i0=1;:::;Mvs
s0=1;:::;S
( inf
y2Ci0;v
s0
kz   yk)g, the set
of locations from which rm (i; s; v) draws its labor.
Lets now consider the absentee landlords problem. LetXL = [XL1 ; :::; X
L
S ],
v = [v1; :::; 
v
S] and  = [
1; :::; V ]. So, the absentee landlord utility function
is UL(XL), and we assume that it has the same standard properties as the
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consumer utility function. The absentee landlord program is therefore:
max
XL
UL(XL) s:t: p XL =
Z
Z
	(z)dz +
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
M vs 
v
s (3)
where XL(
R
Z
	(r)dr; ) is the argmaxof (3).
The following are standard denitions.
IfD is a Lebesgue measurable subset of Z, then 1D is the indicator function
of the set D, namely 1D(x) = 1 if x 2 D and 1D(x) = 0 otherwise: Let nv(z)
be the density of population of type v at location z, with n = [n1; :::; nV ]. For
the matrix T and the vector g, let T  g = [(T  g)1; :::; (T  g)S].
Denition 3 A feasible allocation is a vector
 
C;L;X(); q(); Y;XL; n()
such that 8i; s; v; Ci;vs 2 C, Li;vs  0, Y i;vs  0; XL 2 <S+; and X : Z ! <S+,
q : Z ! <+ and n : Z ! <V+ are measurable functions, such that:
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
MvsX
i=1
1Ci;vs (z) +
VX
v=1
nv(z)qv(z) = 1 almost surely for z 2 Z (4)
Z
Z
nv(z)dz = N v v = 1; :::; V (5)
Li;vs =
Z
Ri;vs
nv(z)dz s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V; i = 1; :::;M vs (6)
Y i;vs = f
v
s (L
i;v
s ; (C
i;v
s )) s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V; i = 1; :::;M
v
s (7)
SX
s=1
SX
s0=1
VX
v=1
VX
v0=1
MvsX
i=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
[ s + (T  g)s] inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
(8)
+
Z
Z
Xvs (z)n
v(z)dz+XLs +
VX
v=1
Z
Z
nv(z)ts (inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk)dz =
VX
v=1
MvsX
i=1
Y i;vs s = 1; :::; S
Equation (4) is the material balance condition for land. Notice that one
unit of land is available at each point in Z and all land is used. This is due to
the fact that we have assumed that both preferences and production functions
are monotonic, which implies that land is productive. In one dimension, this
is a linear city. Our model can easily be generalized to an arbitrary supply
density for land. Equation (5) is the population balance condition. Equation
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(6) is the material balance condition for local labor markets.7 Equation (7)
is production feasibility and equation (8) is material balance for the product
markets. At a feasible allocation, rm (i; s; v) is (almost surely) the only
employer of workers in Ri;vs .
Denition 4 An equilibrium is a vector
(p;	

;	(); w; C; L; X(); q(); Y ; XL ; n())
such that
 
C; L; X(); q(); Y ; XL ; n() is a feasible allocation, p 2 <S+,
	
 2 <+, 	 : Z ! <+ is measurable, w 2 <V+, 	(z) = 	

almost surely for
z 2 S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs , and such that, for each s, for each v, for each i, L
i;v
s and
Ci;v

s solve (1), and such that, for each v, and almost every z 2 Z, Xv(z);
qv

(z) solve (2), and nally such that XL

solves (3).
Denition 5 An equal treatment Pareto optimum is a feasible allocation 
C;L;X(); q(); Y;XL; n()
such that for each v, for each z and z0 with nv(z) > 0 and nv(z0) > 0;
uv = U v(qv(z); Xv(z)) = U v(qv(z0); Xv(z0)); and such that there is no feasible
allocation
 
C 0; L0; X 0(); q0(); Y 0; XL0 ; n0() such that UL(XL0)  UL(XL) and
for all v and all z with nv
0
(z) > 0; U v(qv
0
(z); Xv
0
(z))  uv, with strict in-
equality holding for a set of consumers of positive measure or for the absentee
landlord.
3 What does equilibrium look like?
Example 1, found in the Appendix, motivates our rst result and gives us good
intuition about equilibrium in the case of two rms and two types of workers.
We state the general result.8
7In general, it is possible that there are i, i0, s, s0, v such that (Ri;vs \ Ri
0;v
s0 ) > 0,
namely that two rms using the same type of labor draw it from the same locations, and
these locations have non-negligible overlap. If this were to happen, there would be a serious
problem in the part of the denition of a feasible allocation related to labor, necessitating
a more elaborate denition. However, we note that the denition of a feasible allocation
is not used in Theorem 1, while all remaining results in the paper employ the special case
where rms use hyper-rectangles. In that special case, the set of workers with no unique
closest employer is of measure zero.
8All proofs are given in the Appendix. This Theorem is anything but trivial for the case
K > 1.
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Theorem 1 Fix any equilibrium land allocation for rms, C. Then it has the
property that all rms using positive Lebesgue measure of land are connected
(in the sense of Denition 2).9 Thus, without loss of generality, we can take
equilibrium inter-rm transportation costs to be zero.
The following comments are in order. First, in one dimension (K = 1, a
linear city), the city is monocentric since the rms are connected. However,
contrary to the standard urban economics literature (Fujita (1989)), the Cen-
tral Business District (CBD) is not a point but a set of rms interacting with
each other. It is in this sense the same kind of result as that obtained by Fujita
and Ogawa (1982). In two dimensions, (K = 2, a circular city for example),
the city can be monocentric or the rms can form any connected set, including
an annulus or rectangle. We can have, for example, a circular city where all
rms occupy all the locations on the fringe whereas the consumers reside inside
the ring.
Second, since a rm takes everything as given except for transport costs
(variable or xed, or both), it will seek to minimize them. Thus Theorem
1 will work even with positive variable transportation costs, provided that
these costs are zero when two rms are connected. Thus variable costs can
be taken to be zero without loss of generality, since rms will be connected in
equilibrium in any case. Now consider the case where variable transportation
costs are non-zero even when rms are connected. Positive variable costs make
no di¤erence, in equilibrium, where they are absorbed by the producer. In
this case, they simply are drawn from prots, and can only have the e¤ect
of reinforcing the agglomeration of rms. An alternative assumption is that
they are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for consumption
goods. In this case, variable transport costs are irrelevant to a rms decision
problem, since the rm does not pay them. Once again, Theorem 1 applies
and rms are connected in equilibrium due to the xed set-up cost of the
transport network. Of course, intermediate cases, where variable transport
costs are partially passed through to consumers via higher prices and partially
absorbed by producers, are possible. Theorem 1 is robust to these variations
since variable transport costs only serve to reinforce the agglomeration of rms.
Variable costs will only drive rms together or, if costs are passed to consumers,
be neutral.
Third, the assumption of zero transport costs between connected rms
is not necessary to obtain Theorem 1. We simply must assume that total
9Any rm using zero Lebesgue measure of land is shut down.
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transport costs for a rm are minimized when the rm is connected to every
other. For example, we could add a constant to the transport costs between
rms, independent of location. If two rms are connected, then the transport
cost is just this constant. If the two rms are not connected, then it is the
constant plus the cost dened in section 2. This obviously leads to no alteration
in the result and proof of Theorem 1. It will also be obvious that results in
sections 4, 5 and 6 will still be valid, provided that the constant does not
exceed a rms prots.
More generally, the result given in Theorem 1 holds when the transporta-
tion cost function for a rm is any monotonic increasing function of the pair-
wise (closest point) distances between the rm in question and every other
rm, except that it is assumed that the minimum of the function is attained
when all rms are connected. In other words, transportation cost is a func-
tion of the entire conguration (specically, when all rms are connected), not
just pairwise distances. This function is lower semi-continuous, but it might
not be continuous. The addition of a constant to the cost function given in
section 2 is a special case of this, as specied just above. The result can be
extended even further. For example, consider the case when the location space
is 2 dimensional. Assume that the transportation cost of a rm is equal to a
monotonic function of pairwise distances between it and every other rm ex-
cept in the case when the conguration of rm locations (i.e. the land they
use) is convex; in the latter case we assume that the function reaches its min-
imum (as in the case of connected rms above). Then the same proof gives
us that in any equilibrium (if it exists), the conguration of rms is convex.
Of course the question of existence is then more di¢ cult, since fewer congu-
rations of rms are possible in equilibrium, so (as we shall see) labor must be
more di¤erentiated to give enough freedom in endogenous variables to prove
that such an equilibrium exists. What we are saying, in essence, is that the
equilibrium conguration is driven by assumptions about the transport costs
faced by rms. The assumptions, in turn, are informed by our understand-
ing of real world cost functions as well as common sense, but variations are
certainly compatible with the model and the techniques. Therefore, we can
force any conguration of rms we choose as cost-minimizing to be a necessary
condition for an equilibrium using the ideas above.
Last, at an equilibrium in which all rms are connected, the land price of
any rm inside the interval (in one dimension) is constant and at least as large
as the bid rents at the boundaries of the two extreme rms. In equilibrium, it
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is indeed not possible that any rm has a lower land price since the one next to
it will be induced to move into the land area of the rm in question if the land
price is lower. To see this, consider an equilibriumwhere land prices are not
constant across connected rms. If land price is decreasing at the boundary
of the land used by a particular rm, and if this rm expands its land use
in the direction where the price is decreasing, the rm is not maximizing its
prot since the marginal revenue product of land exceeds its cost. Although
the rst order conditions for prot maximization of this particular rm might
be satised at the equilibriumallocation, a marginal expansion of the rm
land usage will yield greater prot since the second order conditions for prot
maximization will not be satised when land price decreases. Therefore, equi-
librium land price is constant locally around this boundary of the rms land
parcel. Moreover, our denition of equilibrium requires that the price of land
is constant within a rms parcel. In fact, if it relocates it thinks the land price
is constant and the same as at its current location.
4 Determinacy of equilibrium
Examples 2 and 3, contained in the Appendix, illustrate the determinacy prop-
erties of equilibrium. We now study the general case by examining the di-
mension of the set of equilibria (the equilibrium manifold) for a xed set of
exogenous parameters. First, let us dene the bid rent functions.
The bid-rent approach is a well-known technique in urban economics using
duality theory to nd the maximal willingness to pay for land at each loca-
tion (see Fujita (1989)). The consumer with maximal willingness to pay at a
location will live there in equilibrium. Our innovations are to combine it with
di¤erential topology methods for use in determinacy analysis, and to com-
bine it with xed point methods for use in proving existence of equilibrium.
Moreover, we extend bid-rent from a one dimensional to a multi-dimensional
tool.
Let Z = [0; 1]K . Let rm (i; s; v) use the hyper-rectangle Ci;vs  [!h; !h+1]
[0; 1]K 1 where h =
P
s0<s
P
v0<v
M v
0
s0 + i. In this way, rms are always connected.
Then Qi;vs  !h+1   !h, and let ! = (!
[
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
Mvs ]+1
+ !1)=2 be the midpoint of
rm land use.
For this subsection only, we must alter our commuting cost function. The
reason is that, as specied, it is not C1 at zero distance. Thus, for this sub-
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section, we will take it to be a general C1 function t : <+ ! <s+ that is
non-decreasing. For example, t() could be quadratic.
Denition 6 The bid rent function for a type v worker at a given location z
is dened to be:
v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv) (9)
= max
Xv ;qv
f[wv   p Xv   p  t( inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk)]=qv j U v(qv; Xv) = uvg
Dene Xv(z; p; wv; Cv; uv) and qv(z; p; wv; Cv; uv) to be the argmaxof (9).
Of course, there might not be a solution to (9).10 This can happen in several
di¤erent ways, generally at boundaries. For example, uv might specify a level
of utility above the supremum utility in the range of the utility function. In
that case, one would want to set v = 0, qv = 1 and Xv = 1. Another
possibility is a negative value for v, which does not cause problems and is
thus permissible. If the price of some consumption goods are zero, then one
would want to set consumption of those goods to innity, consumption of all
other goods (including land) to zero, and bid-rent at innity. Finally, if utility
were set at its inmum, then one would want to dene all consumption levels
to be zero and bid-rent to be innite.
These boundary problems have no e¤ect on determinacy analysis, which is
next, but can a¤ect the proof of existence of equilibrium. The reason there
is no impact on determinacy analysis is that we will restrict our analysis to
interior (non-zero) prices and utility levels. We only prove that the system is
smooth on this domain; equilibria must reside in this region, so determinacy
analysis can proceed where variables do not hit boundaries. Obviously, to
prove that an equilibrium exists, behavior of the system on boundaries matters.
However, rather than worry about dening bid rent at all of these boundaries,
it is easier simply to dene excess demand correspondences directly at these
boundaries, and be sure that they are upper-hemicontinuous. We shall do this
in the proof of Theorem 4.
Since rms are connected in the spatial arrangement we have postulated,
transportation (but not commuting) cost can be neglected. This simplies
matters substantially. The optimization problem (1) of rm (i; s; v) becomes:
max
Li;vs ;Q
i;v
s
vs = ps fs(L
i;v
s ; Q
i;v
s )  wvLi;vs  Qi;vs 	 (10)
10This problem is usually not addressed by models using the bid-rent approach, but should
be. We are grateful to Guy Laroque for pointing this out.
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where 	 will be the (uniform) price of land for rms. Dene vs(ps; w
v;	) to be
the maximum and dene Li;vs (ps; w
v;	) and Qi;vs (ps; w
v;	) to be the argmax
of (10), all of which exist if wv and 	 are positive. Given our assumptions
on production, if a solution to (10) exists, it is unique. Given Qi;vs (ps; w
v;	),
dene Ci;vs (ps; w
v;	) to be the hyper-rectangle given above Denition 6.
Of course, as in the case of bid rent (9), there might not be a solution to
(10) when the price of an input is zero. Once again, these boundary problems
have no e¤ect on determinacy analysis, which is next, but can a¤ect the proof
of existence of equilibrium. Thus, we shall take up this issue in the proof of
Theorem 4.
We begin by restating the set of equations that dene equilibrium. The
goal, as in Berliant and Kung (2006), is to reduce the number of equations and
endogenous variables from a continuum to a nite number. That is why we
use bid rent. Substituting demands and supplies into the feasibility conditions
(4) (8) and using (9) and (10), we obtain:
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
MvsX
i=1
1Ci;vs (ps;wv ;	)(z) +
VX
v=1
nv(z)qv(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)  1 = 0 (11)
almost surely for z 2 ZZ
Z
nv(z)dz  N v = 0 v = 1; :::; V (12)
Li;vs (ps; w
v;	) 
Z
Ri;vs
nv(z)dz = 0 s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V; i = 1; :::;M vs
(13)
Y i;vs = f
v
s
 
Li;vs (ps; w
v;	); (Ci;vs (ps; w
v;	))

s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V; i = 1; :::;M vs
(14)
VX
v=1
Z
Z
Xvs (z; p; w
v; Cv; uv)nv(z)dz +XLs (z; p; w
v; Cv; uv) (15)
+
VX
v=1
Z
Z
nv(z)ts (inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk)dz =
VX
v=1
MvsX
i=1
Y i;vs s = 1; :::; S
We assume that for xed output prices, xed wages, xed locations of rms,
and xed utility levels, all the consumer bid rent functions are well-behaved in
the sense of Fujita (1989, denition 4.1, p.99) and that each pair of bid rent
functions crosses on a set of measure zero. A related assumption is that bid
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rent functions can be ordered by relative steepness (see assumption 4.3, p.102
in Fujita (1989)). Our denition is di¤erent from Fujitas since consumers
work in and thus commute to di¤erent places while in Fujita they all work in
the same place (the CBD). Formally, the assumption is:
8v 6= v0; 8p; wv; wv0 ; Cv; Cv0 ; uv; uv0 almost surely for z 2 Z n S[
s=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs
@v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)
@z
6= @
v0(z; p; wv
0
; Cv
0
; uv
0
)
@z
We use this assumption in order to be sure that the bid-rent functions of con-
sumers do not coincide on an open set of locations. For if they were to coincide,
the bid rent approach would not lead to a unique distribution of population.
In this case, we would have to deal with aggregate demand correspondences
instead of functions and both determinacy and equilibrium analysis would be
much more complicated, but the results would likely be similar. Our assump-
tion would follow, for instance, if consumers have Cobb-Douglas utilities where
di¤erent types of workers have di¤erent parameters attached to land consump-
tion. We conjecture that our assumption is generic in utilities, though that
idea is far removed from the point of this work.
We also want land consumption for workers and rms, composite good
consumption and rm labor demand to be well-dened as functions of prot
levels, utility levels, wages and prices. That is the next step, and we will
obtain this result in Lemma 1 below.
We reformulate the equilibrium conditions using a bid rent approach (see
e.g., Fujita and Ogawa (1982) or Fujita (1989)).
Let  : Z<S+<V+C
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
Mvs <V ! < be an arbitrary smooth function
(we write (z; p; w; C; u), where u = [u1; :::; uV ] are utility levels) so that for all
(p; w; C; u), @(z; p; w; C; u)=@z1 < 08 z1 < !; @(z; p; w; C; u)=@z1 > 08z1 >
!; and inf
z2Zn S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs
(z; p; w; C; u)  sup
z2 S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs
maxv=1;:::;V [
v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)]:
The purpose of the function  is to stand in for the maximal bid-rent function,
since the latter function is not smooth.11 The restriction on the slope of 
will ensure that when the price of land paid by the rms, 	, is too low, there
is excess demand for land. If it is too high, there is excess supply. We let
  1 be a variable that will scale . Once we have some function  satisfying
11An example is (z; p; w;C; u) = (z1   !)2 + (p; w;C; u) where  is smooth and
(p; w;C; u)  sup
z2 S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs
maxv=1;:::;V [
v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)] pointwise on its domain.
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the requirements just above,    will also satisfy these requirements, leading
to another degree of indeterminacy.
Let
Zv = fz 2 Z n S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs j   (z; p; w; C; u)  	
and 0  v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv) = max
v=1;:::;V
[v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)]g
[fz 2 S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs j   (z; p; w; C; u) > 	
and 0  v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv) = max
v=1;:::;V
[v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)]g
Since we shall employ Walraslaw in the context of the bid-rent approach,
we must dene (out of equilibrium) rent collections:
R(p; w; C; u;	) 
VX
v=1
Z
Zv
v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)dz +	  ( S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs )
This is consistent with (3) in equilibrium.
The remaining equilibrium equations areZ
Zv
1
qv(z; p; wv; Cv(ps; wv;	); uv)
dz  N v = 0 v = 1; :::; V (16)
Li;vs (ps; w
v;	) 
Z
Ri;vs \Zv
1
qv(z; p; wv; Cv(ps; wv;	); uv)
dz = 0 (17)
s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V; i = 1; :::;M vs
VX
v=1
Z
Z
Xvs (z; p; w
v; Cv(ps; w
v;	); uv)
qv(z; p; wv; Cv(ps; wv;	); uv)
dz +XLs (R; ) (18)
+
VX
v=1
Z
Z
1
qv(z; p; wv; Cv(ps; wv;	); uv)
ts (inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk)dz
 
VX
v=1
MvsX
i=1
f vs
 
Li;vs (ps; w
v;	); (Ci;vs (ps; w
v;	))

= 0 s = 1; :::; S


z 2 S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs (ps; w
v;	) j   (z; p; w; C; u) > 	)

(19)
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 

z 2 Zn[ S[
s=1
V[
v=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs (ps; w
v;	)] j   (z; p; w; C; u) < 	)

= 0
where equation (19) is the market clearing condition for land under the bid
rent approach.
We need to show that the LHS of equations (16) (19) are continuous func-
tions for the proof of existence and smooth functions for determinacy analysis.
Dene

 =
(
(p; w;	) j
SX
s=1
ps +
VX
v=1
wv +	 = 1; ps > 0; w
v > 0;	 > 0; s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V
)
and u = f(u1; :::; uV ) 2 <V+ j uv > 0 for v = 1; ::; V g.
We recapitulate our key assumptions here for completeness.
Lemma 1 Suppose that r  1 and for each v, U v is Cr+1 di¤erentiably strictly
convex (and thus has no critical point). Suppose that for each s and v, f vs is
Cr+1 and that D2f vs is negative denite (thus f
v
s is strictly concave). Suppose
that for each (z; p; wv; Cv; uv) and wv
0
; Cv
0
; uv
0
, @
v(z;p;wv ;Cv ;uv)
@z
6= @v(z;p;wv
0
;Cv
0
;uv
0
)
@z
.
Suppose that commuting cost as a function of distance to a rm, t : <+ ! <s+,
is Cr with @ts
@r
 0 for all s. Finally, restrict attention to those allocations
where rms using each type of labor v are connected. Then the equation sys-
tem (16) (19) is Cr on domain 
  u.12
To examine determinacy of equilibrium we use the implicit function theo-
rem (see Mas-Colell (1985, theorem C.3.2, p.20)). If zero is a regular value of
the set of functions dened by the LHS of equations (16) (19), then by the
implicit function theorem the set of equilibria forms a manifold of dimension
equal to the number of unknowns minus the number of equations. Any reg-
ular parameterization (see Mas-Colell (1985, denition 5.8.12, p.226)) of the
economies dened by the LHS of equations (16) (19) will imply that zero is a
regular value generically in the parameters; see Mas-Colell (1985, proposition
8.3.1, p.320). An example of a regular parameterization of our system can be
found in our Appendix.
This is the point at which the results for models with location, such as this
one, begin to diverge from those more standard models without location. First,
12For the usual reasons, equilibria will never lie on the boundary of 
  u, so we do
not need to examine behavior of our system on the boundary of 
u for the equilibrium
determinacy analysis that follows.
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notice that there will be a di¤erent equilibriummanifold for each order of rms.
In essence, the set of all equilibria will be the union of these manifolds. Second,
there will be a distinction between the dimension of the equilibrium manifold
under symmetry of the conguration of rms as opposed to asymmetry. This
latter subject requires a denition.
Denition 7 If for all v = 1; :::; V and s = 1; :::; S, except for one (v0; s0),
M vs = 2 or M
v
s = 0,
13 and either M v
0
s0 = 1 or M
v0
s0 = 0, then we call the
production sector symmetrizable. An order of rms is a list of all rms by
type (v; s) in the economy. An order is called symmetric if it reads the same
from left to right as from right to left.
The idea behind this denition is that a production sector is symmetrizable
if and only if one can create a symmetric distribution of rms, placing the
exceptional rm (v0; s0) (if it is present) in the middle of the interval and
allocating each pair of identical rms on either side of the exceptional rm
so as to create a symmetric distribution. When this is possible, determinacy
properties are di¤erent.
Theorem 2 Let K = 1; Z = [0; 1] and suppose that the production sector is
not symmetrizable. Let r > min(0; V  
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs +2).
14 Take any Cr regular
parameterization of the economies dened by (16) (19).15 Fix any order of
rms (from left to right). Then generically in parameters, the set of equilibria
forms a manifold of dimension:
V  
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
M vs + 2 (20)
This theorem is in accordance with Examples 2 and 3, found in the Ap-
pendix. Indeed, in Example 3 where S = 2; V = 2 and
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs = 2, we
obtain two dimensions of indeterminacy, which is consistent with formula (20)
(generically). Now consider Example 2 with S = 2; V = 1 and two di¤erent
rms. It is easy to check by using formula (20) that there is one dimension of
indeterminacy (generically).
13This particular kind of economy follows the biblical story of Noahs ark.
14Since V 
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
Mvs , r  3 is su¢ cient.
15For example, use the lemma to obtain such a Cr system.
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This means that existence and determinacy of equilibrium are very sensitive
to both the degree of labor di¤erentiation and the number of rms. What is
the intuition about why the degree of indeterminacy is expressed according to
formula (20)? Consider the rms with the same labor input and same output.
These rms must have the same prot level in equilibrium. It is the number
of such equal prot constraints that a¤ects the formula (20). So as labor
becomes more di¤erentiated, there are fewer such constraints. Hence, the more
di¤erentiated the labor, the larger the variety of equilibria. Another way of
interpreting the intuition behind formula (20) is that identical rms must o¤er
the same wages to the same workers and this cannot compensate for locational
and hence commuting cost di¤erences between rms.
Theorem 3 Let K = 1; Z = [0; 1] and suppose that the production sector
is symmetrizable. Fix any symmetric order of rms. Let r > min(0; V  
[
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs ]=2+1) if the number of rms is even, and r > min(0; V [
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs+
1]=2 + 1) if the number of rms is odd. Take any Cr regular parameterization
of the economies dened by (16) (19). Then generically in parameters, the
set of equilibria forms a manifold of dimension:
V   [
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
M vs ]=2 + 1 (21)
if the number of rms is even and
V   [
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
M vs + 1]=2 + 1 (22)
if the number of rms is odd.
What distinguishes symmetrizable production sectors is that we only need
to deal with half (possibly plus one) the number of rms. This means that
the number of constraints in a symmetric equilibrium, particularly in (17), can
be dropped by half (modulo the central rm). The reason the last term in
the indeterminacy formula is 1 for this theorem whereas its 2 for the previous
theorem is that under symmetry, !, the midpoint of rm land use, is xed,
whereas under asymmetry, its not.
In the general case when Z is not necessarily [0; 1], the analysis above
applies, but it is very di¢ cult to parameterize the location of rms. When
Z = [0; 1]K , formula (20) gives only a lower bound on the dimension of the
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equilibrium manifold, since rms might not be congured in the linear fash-
ion that we have postulated. Congurations that are not rectangular are also
possible. At the end of section 3, we discussed various congurations of rms.
In the most general case when Z is an arbitrary compact, convex subset of
<k, Theorem 1 tells us that rms will be connected but the conguration can
vary in a multitude of ways. Hence, it is di¢ cult to draw general conclusions
about the determinacy properties of equilibrium when location is multidimen-
sional, except for noting that the general expression for the dimension of the
equilibrium manifold becomes larger as labor di¤erentiation increases.
5 Existence of equilibrium
Putting aside the problem of multiplicity of equilibria, we next provide su¢ -
cient conditions for the set of equilibria to be non-empty. In the Appendix
we provide Example 4 where formula (22) tells us that equilibria should be
locally unique (as the dimension of the equilibrium manifold is equal to zero),
but the set of equilibria is in fact empty. This might seem paradoxical given
formula (22), but the resolution, of course, is that the empty set is a manifold
of any dimension.
Theorem 4 Fix K, a positive integer. Let Z = [0; 1]K. Suppose that labor is
completely di¤erentiated, that is V =
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs . Suppose that the assumptions
of Lemma 1 hold with r = 1. Then there exists an equilibrium.
We have an analogous result when the production sector is symmetrizable,
since in that case only half the rms matter.
Theorem 5 Fix K, a positive integer. Let Z = [0; 1]K. Suppose that the
production sector is symmetrizable, and that labor is completely di¤erentiated
in each half-economy, that is
V = [
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
M vs ]=2 (23)
if the number of rms is even and
V = [
SX
s=1
VX
v=1
M vs + 1]=2 (24)
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if the number of rms is odd. Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 1 hold
with r = 1. Then there exists an equilibrium.
In cases not covered by these two Theorems, it is easy to generate coun-
terexamples like the one in the Appendix. If two rms are drawing their labor
supply from the same pool of commuters, one of the rms is going to be far-
ther away from the pool and will never be able to hire the labor it demands at
any wage. Example 4 shows that the assumptions on labor di¤erentiation in
Theorems 4 and 5 are tight. When these conditions are satised, Theorems 2
and 3 imply (generically) that there is a continuum of equilibria.
The method of proof can be extended to more general settings. For in-
stance, Z can be more general. In more general settings, one must be careful
with land parcels used by rms since they can hit the boundary of Z; that
is the reason we use the particular connected spatial conguration of rms in
this theorem.
Observe also that the assumption that markets for all goods (including
labor) except land are competitive is used to prove Theorem 1. Indeed, our
equilibrium concept is such that each rm takes all prices as given. If product
and labor markets were not competitive, i.e. rms do not take all prices as
given, then rm reaction correspondences would not be convex valued since
given prices, a rms prot could be maximized at two di¤erent locations. In
this case, the existence of equilibrium could not be proved in the way we have
done it.
6 Welfare properties of equilibrium
Theorem 6 An equilibrium allocation might not be Pareto optimal.
The proof (found in the Appendix) proceeds by presenting an example
where the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal. This is accomplished
by taking an equilibrium where the only two rms in the economy are adjacent,
pulling them apart a little bit, and putting some consumers in between the
rms, thereby reducing commuting costs. Although transportation costs rise,
parameters are taken so that this is more than o¤set by the drop in commuting
cost.
Notice that, if a Pareto optimum exists, it will not have adjacent rms (for
the reason given in the proof of Theorem 6), and thus will not be an equilibrium
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allocation. Therefore, the second welfare theorem will also fail for this model
and this example, provided that a Pareto optimum exists for this example. We
do not prove that a Pareto optimum (equal treatment or otherwise) exists for
this example since such a proof is both technical and peripheral to our work
here.
Notice also that even though rms and consumers are price takers in all
markets, we still have a market failure. More precisely, when a rm moves it
anticipates the relocation of its workers, but it does not take into account that
it a¤ects workerscommuting cost and hence utility levels. In a certain sense,
there is an externality that causes a market failure.
7 Conclusion
This article has explained city structure driven by labor di¤erentiation and
transportation costs. We have examined the characteristics, welfare properties,
existence and determinacy of equilibrium.
It is immediately apparent from section 6 that there is a role for the gov-
ernment in improving consumer welfare relative to an equilibrium allocation,
since the two welfare theorems can fail. In the one dimensional example, the
government might be able to improve welfare by separating rms and reducing
consumer commuting cost. It would be interesting to examine this further in
a more general setting.
Theorem 1 provides a testable implication of the model: that rms are con-
nected in equilibrium. Comparative static properties of the model are within
reach but messy. One can see that the more di¤erentiated the labor, the
larger the variety of equilibria. For example, in the homogeneous labor case
for K = 1, V = 1, S = 2, supposing that there are 3 rms producing each of
the two products, then there is no equilibrium. When labor is di¤erentiated,
K = 1, V = 6, S = 2 so that each rm uses a unique type of labor, then
generically there is a continuum of equilibria. Thus, the variety of city types
is positively related to the degree of labor di¤erentiation, a second testable
implication of the model. The collection of essays in Pereira and Mata (1996)
provide interesting data on this subject for Portugal.
Our results provide an illustration of the manifestations of indivisibilities
in location models. Due to the discreteness with which rms must be ordered
in one dimension, the set of equilibria for xed values of other exogenous
parameters can skip from emptiness to a continuum as labor di¤erentiation is
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increased.
Our model can be extended in the following way. We have taken as ex-
ogenous the general and specic human capital of workers. We can make the
choice of human capital endogenous by adding a rst stage to the model in
which each worker chooses an investment in human capital, with perfect fore-
sight, that will determine their skill and type in the second stage. The rst
stage can be handled in a standard way, for example as in Rosen (1983). The
second stage is the model examined in the present paper where the popula-
tions of the various types of workers are endogenous and determined in the
rst stage. We intend to examine this more elaborate model in the future.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Examples
Example 1 Two di¤erent rms and two di¤erent types of workers: equilib-
rium with adjacent rms.
Take K = 1, Z = [0; 1]: There are two rms; rm 1 produces good 1
using type 1 labor and rm 2 produces good 2 using type 2 labor. Hence,
we have: S = 2, V = 2, M11 = 1, M
2
2 = 1, M
2
1 = 0 and M
1
2 = 0. We will
simplify the notation and omit some of the subscripts and superscripts. The
transportation technologies are given by [t; 0] (for consumers) and [ ; 0] (for
rms), where good 1 is taken to be the numéraire. There is a xed transport
cost but no variable cost. Assume the utility and the production functions are
respectively equal to:
U v(qv; Xv) = (qv)1=3(Xv1 )
1=3(Xv2 )
1=3 v = 1; 2
fs(Ls; Qs) = (Ls)
1=4(Qs)
1=4 s = 1; 2
We omit the superscript since there is one rm of each type and s = v. In
this example, the prot function of rm 1 reduces to:
1 = L
1=4
1 (z
+
1   z 1 )1=4   w1L1  
z+1Z
z 1
	(z)dz   (z 2   z+1 ) (25)
where Cv = [z v ; z
+
v ]; v = 1; 2 and without loss of generality we take rm 1 on
the left and rm 2 on the right. Observe that we use here a general formulation
of the rent function 	(z); we will impose our assumption concerning the rms
view of the price of land shortly, as we wish to explain it in the context of this
example.
Since a consumer/worker consumes both goods but can work only in the
rm using labor type v to produce good s = v, we can study the optimization
problem of type v workers and the optimization problem of the rm where
they work, denoted by rm v. Thus, the budget constraint for a type v worker
working in a rm v reduces to:
Xv1 + p2X
v
2 + q
v	(z) + t

minfz+v   z ; z v   zg = wv v = 1; 2 (26)
By combining the rst order conditions of the workers program, we obtain:
qv(z) =
1
3

wv   t [minfjz+v   zj ; jz v   zjg]
	(z)

v = 1; 2 (27)
2
Workers of type v are indi¤erent between locations z+v and z
 
v so if they live
at both locations the rents must be the same. We have therefore:
	(z+v ) = 	(z
 
v ) v = 1; 2 (28)
It is a necessary condition if consumers of type v are to live on both sides of
rm s = v when solving (2).
Maximizing v with respect to z+v ; z
 
v and Lv yields:
1
4
L1=4v (z
+
v   z v ) 3=4  	(z+v ) +  = 0 v = 1; 2 (29)
1
4
L1=4v (z
+
v   z v ) 3=4  	(z v ) = 0 v = 1; 2 (30)
1
4
L 3=4v (z
+
v   z v )1=4   wv = 0 v = 1; 2 (31)
Equation (28) implies that, independent of the location of the rm, in equilib-
rium land rent at the endpoints are equal to the same constant. We assume
that land price is constant in the interval Cv = [z v ; z
+
v ], v = 1; 2. As we will
see, this will be consistent with equilibrium. Under this assumption, the rm
perceives that, no matter where it locates, and accounting for the movement
of consumers (who behave competitively) the unit price of land is always the
same. Combining (29) and (30) yields:
	(z v ) +  = 	(z
+
v ) v = 1; 2 (32)
Actually, (32) is a necessary condition for Cv = [z v ; z
+
v ] to be prot maximiz-
ing, that is, to prevent a deviation by rm v. This condition rst appeared
in Berliant and Fujita (1992) in the context of Alonsos discrete model of con-
sumer location. The intuition and reasons for its presence are the same in this
model and Alonsos model. Consider altering rm 1s parcel by removing a
marginal piece of land from the side of the parcel further away from rm 2
and adding a marginal piece of land to the side of the parcel closer to rm
2; this will not a¤ect output or revenue of rm 1. Due to the xed cost of
the transportation of goods, the xed transportation cost will decrease by  .
So, at a prot maximum, the absolute di¤erence between the price of land at
either end of the parcel of rm 1 must be  .
Now, suppose that type v workers locate on both sides of rm v, i.e., at
z+v and z
 
v . Then equations (28) and (32) are contradictory. What is going on
here? The implication is that workers of type 1 can only reside on one side of
rm 1 and similarly for rm 2.
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Recalling equation (25) and keeping the size of the land parcel used by rm
v constant, all the terms of the prot function are constant except the xed
transportation cost of commodities. Since rms are maximizing prot, in Nash
equilibrium each rm will choose to be adjacent to the other.
In the next two examples, we use Cobb-Douglas utility and production
functions, a one dimensional location space (K = 1 and Z = [0; 1]), and
transportation technology given by [t; 0] (for consumers) and [ ; 0] (for rms),
so that transport and commuting cost are paid in terms of good 1 only. Good
1 is taken to be the numéraire. There are no variable costs. Contrary to
example 1, we do not want to examine what equilibrium looks like (since by
Theorem 1 we know that all rms are connected in equilibrium), but instead
we want to examine its determinacy properties. For that we consider two
examples corresponding to two di¤erent cases: a one dimensional continuum
of equilibria and a two dimensional continuum of equilibria.
Example 2 Two di¤erent rms and homogeneous workers: the case of a one
dimensional continuum of equilibria.
There are two di¤erent rms using the same type of labor V = 1 to produce
di¤erent outputs s = 1; 2. In equilibrium, the two rms are connected (The-
orem 1) and the transport cost of goods is zero. We have therefore: S = 2;
V = 1; M11 = 1; M
1
2 = 1; M
2
2 = 0 and M
2
1 = 0. As in example 1, land parcels
used by each rm i = 1; 2 are denoted by C1 = [z 1 ; z
+
1 ] and C2 = [z
 
2 ; z
+
2 ].
Without loss of generality, we take rm 1 on the left and rm 2 on the right
so that the location of each rm is denoted by zi, i = 1; 2 with zi = z 1 or
zi = z
+
2 .
In this context, each consumer located at z and working at rm i solves
the following program:
max
q;X1;X2
U(q;X1; X2) = q
1=3X
1=3
1 X
1=3
2 s:t: X1+p2X2+q	(z)+t jz   zij = w
By di¤erentiating the Lagrangian of this program with respect to q;X1; X2 and
 (the Lagrange multiplier), and by combining the four resulting equations,
we obtain the following Marshallian demands:
q =
1
3	(z)
[w   t jz   zij] X1 =
1
3
[w   t jz   zij] X2 =
1
3p2
[w   t jz   zij]
The indirect utility function is thus equal to:
U(q; X1 ; X

2 ) =
1
3
[w   t jz   zij] (p2	(z)) 1=3  u
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where u is the equilibrium utility level for all (homogeneous) workers in the
city. The bid rent function, (), which is the inverse of the indirect utility
function with respect to 	(z), is equal to:
(z; zi; u
) =
(u) 3
9p2
[w   t jz   zij]3 :
In equilibrium, workersbid rent (z; zi; u) is equal to the equilibrium land
rent 	(z) at each residential location z 2 Z. Moreover, in equilibrium, it must
be that all workers reach utility level u and that 	(z 1 ) = 	(z
+
2 ) =
1
9p2
 
w
u
3
,
which implies that all workers in the city earn the same wage w and consume
the same amount of q; X1 and X

2 . We have therefore:
	 =
1
9p2
 w
u
3
  (33)
where   1 is a scaling factor that xes, in equilibrium, how much above the
maximal consumer bid-rent the producer land price will be set. There will be
a one dimensional continuum of equilibria in this example, indexed by .
Let us now focus on rm is program. It solves:
max
Li;z
+
i ;z
 
i
i = pi L
1=4
i (z
+
i   z i )1=4   wLi  	(z+i   z i ) i = 1; 2
where p1 = 1 and p2 > 0. By combining the rst order conditions and by using
(33), we easily obtain:
(z+1   z 1 ) = 332 4p3=22 w 5u9=2 3=2
(z+2   z 2 ) = 332 4p32w 5u9=2 3=2
L1 = 2
 43 p1=22 w
 3u3=2 1=2
L2 = 2
 43 p7=32 w
 3u3=2 1=2
Using these values, the equilibrium prot is equal to:
1 = 2
 33 p1=22 w
 2u3=2 1=2
2 = 2
 33 p22w
 2u3=2 1=2

3p
1=3
2   1

So with this example, we have closed form solutions and there is a one
dimensional continuum of equilibria indexed by . The intuition is as follows.
When there are two rms connected to each other, there is no inducement for
them to change location. Consumers have the same level of utility whatever
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rm they choose as employer. The di¤erent equilibria are indexed by the price
di¤erential between rm land and consumer land.
There is one interesting feature of this example that we wish to note. There
are two market clearing conditions for labor (one for each rm) but only one
wage, since there is only one type of worker. In order to get enough freedom in
endogenous variables to generate an equilibrium, the midpoint of rm land !
is used. By varying this to the left or right, the supply of labor commuting to
one of the two rms can be equated to demand. This gives us two endogenous
variables to satisfy the two labor market clearing conditions. Since technologies
are symmetric, the equilibrium ! will be 1/2.
Example 3 Two di¤erent rms and two di¤erent types of workers: the case
of a two dimensional continuum of equilibria.
We use exactly the same hypotheses as in example 1 but we focus on
the determinacy properties of the equilibrium. In equilibrium all (two) rms
are connected so that the good transportation costs are zero (Theorem 1). By
combining the rst order conditions for both rms and workers and equilibrium
conditions, we obtain:
w1
w2
5=8
N1
N2
 1=2 a
b
1=4 
p2
= 1
and
	(z) = a


 
w1   t(z 1   z)
3
= b


 
w2   t(z   z+2 )
3
where a and b are constants of integration.
By further manipulating the equations dening equilibrium, one can see
that equilibrium exists, and in fact, there is a one dimensional family of equi-
libria parameterized by a constant of integration or by the location of a rm.
There is another one dimensional family parameterized by , as in the previous
example. This means that there is a two dimensional continuum of equilib-
ria. The main di¤erence with the previous example is that since workers are
heterogeneous they will not necessarily reach the same utility level and it is
possible that u1 6= u2. Thus, there is one less equation that must hold in
equilibrium, compared to example 2.
Moreover, from these equations, it appears that prices (and consumption
and production) are genuinely di¤erent in these equilibria. Indeed, the equi-
libria that form this two dimensional continuum cannot be obtained from one
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another by simple translation of the location of agents. There are substantial
di¤erences in both prices and allocations of di¤erent equilibria, and thus there
is genuine indeterminacy.
Example 4 Three identical rms and homogeneous workers: no equilibrium.
There are three rms using the same type of labor V = 1 to produce the
same type of output S = 1, which is taken as the numéraire. We have therefore:
S = 1; V = 1; M11 = 3. In equilibrium all (three) rms are connected so that
the good transportation costs are zero (Theorem 1). Without loss of generality,
we take rm 1 on the left, rm 3 on the right, and rm 2 in between so that
the location of each rm is denoted by zi, i = 1; 2; 3 with zi = z 1 or zi = z
 
2
or zi = z+2 (= z
 
3 ) or zi = z
+
3 . Moreover, land parcels consumed by each rm
i = 1; 2; 3 are denoted by Ci = [z i ; z
+
i ]. Each individual residing at z and
working at rm i solves the following program:
max
q;X
U(q;X) = q1=2X1=2 s:t: X + q	(z) + t jz   zij = w
By combining the rst order conditions, we easily obtain:
q =
w   t jz   zij
2	(z)
X =
w   t jz   zij
2
Let us denote by u the equilibrium utility level for all (homogeneous) workers
in the city. Then, the bid rent (), which is the inverse of the indirect utility
function with respect to 	(z), is equal to
(z; zi; u
) =

w   t jz   zij
2u
2
In equilibrium, where workersbid rent coincides with the equilibrium land
rent at each location, we must have that all workers reach the utility level u
and that:
	(z 1 ) = 	(z
+
1 ) = 	(z
 
2 ) = 	(z
+
2 ) = 	(z
 
3 ) = 	(z
+
3 ) (34)
Now consider the comparison of commuting cost for a consumer commuting
to rms 1 and 3 as opposed to rm 2. We have:
	(z 1 ) = 	(z
+
3 ) =
 w
2u
2
> 	(z 2 ) =

w   t (z 2   z 1 )
2u
2
(35)
= 	(z+2 ) =

w   t (z+3   z+2 )
2u
2
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which contradicts (34), if and only if z+3   z+2 = z 2   z 1 > 0. We now show
that if rms maximize their prot, this is always true. The prot function of
rm i is equal to:
i = L
1=4(z+i   z i )  wL  	(z+i )(z+i   z i ) i = 1; 2; 3
By combining the rst order equations, we obtain:
z+i   z i =
wL
	(z+i )
> 0 i = 1; 2; 3
Therefore, when rms maximize their prot, inequality (35) always holds and
no equilibrium with connected rms can exist since it contradicts the equilib-
rium condition (34). The intuition is quite simple. Since all three rms are
using the same input to produce the same output and since in equilibrium,
one of the rms has to be in between the other two, the commuting cost of all
consumers to that rm is larger than to the others. So nobody would work
there and there is no equilibrium. Obviously for rm 2 located in between
rms 1 and 3, u can never be reached by any worker commuting to rm 2
since the commuting distance and cost is greater and the competitive wage w
must be the same for all workers in any rm. So why doesnt rm 2 simply shut
down, and why isnt there an equilibrium with only rms 1 and 3 operating?
Notice that in this example, there is a decreasing returns to scale technology
for each rm. So in such a conguration, rms 1 and 3 earn positive prots,
while rm 2 is shut down and earns zero prots. Thus, rm 2 will try to
mimic the production plan (including land usage) of another rm, resulting in
disequilibrium.
Observe that the argument depends crucially on the dimension of the loca-
tion space Z. If Z were two dimensional, then it would be possible to construct
an equilibrium for this example since the three rms can be connected and at
the same time workers do not have to cross one rm to work at another.
8.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
Suppose that in an equilibrium, not all rms are connected. Then the
xed transport cost for every rm is positive. Let us focus on one rm, the
rm (i; s; v) given in (b) of the assumption on the collection C. Dene
() = ps(i; s; v) f
v
s (L
i;v
s ; (B(C
i;v
s )))  wvLi;vs   (B(Ci;vs ))	
8
 
SX
s0=1
VX
v0=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
p(i; s; v)  [ + T  g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0)] inf
x2B(Ci;vs )
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
:
We will show that under the assumptions of the Theorem, the equilibrium
production plan of rm (i; s; v) is not prot optimizing, leading to a contra-
diction. In order to accomplish this, we use part (a) of the assumption on the
collection C and a one term Taylors series expansion of  at  = 0.
() = (0) +   ps(i; s; v)  d f vs (Li;vs ; (Ci;vs ))=dQ  dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0
  	  dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0
+ 
SX
s0=1
VX
v0=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
p(i; s; v)  [ + T  g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0)] inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
+R();
where lim
!0
R()

= 0.
(The sign on the transport cost term is reversed because an  expansion
of land use by rm (i; s; v) results in a decrease in transport cost.) Now in
equilibrium, it must be the case that
0  ()  (0) =   ps(i; s; v)  d f vs (Li;vs ; (Ci;vs ))=dQ  dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0
  	  dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0
+ 
SX
s0=1
VX
v0=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
p(i; s; v)  [ + T  g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0)] inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
+R();
so
 	 dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0  ps(i; s; v) d f vs (Li;vs ; (Ci;vs ))=dQ dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0
+ 
SX
s0=1
VX
v0=1
Mv
0
s0X
j=1
p(i; s; v)  [ + T  g(i;s;v)(j;s0;v0)] inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk  I
X
(i;s;v)
(j;s0;v0)
+R():
Now since transport costs for this rm are positive, the second to last term is
positive and by choosing  small so that the second to last term dominates the
last term
 	 dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0>  ps(i; s; v) d f vs (Li;vs ; (Ci;vs ))=dQ dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0
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or
	  dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0> ps(i; s; v)  d f vs (Li;vs ; (Ci;vs ))=dQ  dg(Ci;vs ; )=d j=0 :
This condition says that the cost of the last unit of land exceeds its marginal
revenue product. Next we apply part (b) of the assumption on collection C:
for every 0 > 0 there is an A 2 C, A  Ci;vs a.s. with (Ci;vs )   0 < (A) <
(Ci;vs ) and
inf
x2Ci;vs
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk = inf
x2A
y2Cj;v0
s0
kx  yk
so transport cost is unchanged when replacing Ci;vs with A. So by choosing 
0
small, the rm has higher prots using less land A instead of Ci;vs , contradicting
prot optimization in equilibrium on the part of rm (i; s; v).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Our goal is to show that the equation system (16) (19) is Cr. In order
to accomplish this, it is convenient to establish some preliminary results rst,
namely that supply and demand are Cr. The proofs of these preliminary
results parallel the proof of Mas-Colell (1985, Proposition 2.7.2, p.85), but
with a subtle twist due to our use of bid rent.
Let us begin with production. Prots are given in equation (10), and the
rst order conditions are:
ps
@f vs (L;Q)
@L
  wv = 0
ps
@f vs (L;Q)
@Q
 	 = 0
This equation system has (L;Q) as endogenous variables as functions of prices,
(ps; w
v;	), and any other exogenous variables desired. The Jacobian of this
equation system (with respect to the endogenous variables) is simply the
Hessian of f vs . By assumption, D
2f vs (x) is negative denite, so by Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green (1995, Example M.D.1, p.937), the determinant of this
Hessian is positive. Using the implicit function theorem (Mas-Colell, 1985,
C.32, p.20), the derived demand functions are Cr. Plugging the derived de-
mand functions back into the Cr+1 production function, a Cr supply function
for outputs is obtained.
10
Turning next to the consumption sector, we use a similar technique. Bid
rent is dened in equation (9). From Mas-Colell (1985, D.1, p.22), the rst
order conditions are:

 p
qv

+ DXvU
v(qv; Xv) = 0
 [wv   p Xv   p  t (inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk)]=(qv)2 + DqvU v(qv; Xv) = 0
 uv + U v(qv; Xv) = 0
The rst equation implies that both  and  are positive, so dening  =
= > 0, the rst order conditions become:
DXvU
v(qv; Xv)  

p
qv

= 0
DqvU
v(qv; Xv)  [wv   p Xv   p  t (inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk)]=(qv)2 = 0
 uv + U v(qv; Xv) = 0
This equation system has (qv; Xv; ) as endogenous variables as functions of
prices, (p; wv), and any other exogenous variables desired. The Jacobian of
this equation system (with respect to the endogenous variables) is as follows:
A =
0B@ D2XvU v D2XvqvU v + p=(qv)2  p=qvD2qvXvU v + p=(qv)2 D2qvU v + 2=(qv)3  =(qv)2
DXvU
v DqvU
v 0
1CA
where   wv   p Xv   p  t (inf
y2Ci;vs
i=1;:::;Mvs
s=1;:::;S
kz   yk).
Substitute the rst order conditions into the last column and multiply the
last column by  ; we obtain a new matrix B, where Det(A) =   1

Det(B).
Now multiply the last row by 1=qv and subtract it from the next to last row
of B. Multiply the last column by 1=qv and subtract it from the next to last
column of B. The result is the matrix
C =
0B@ D2XvU v D2XvqvU v DXvU vD2qvXvU v D2qvU v DqvU v
DXvU
v DqvU
v 0
1CA
where   1

Det(C) =   1

Det(B) = Det(A). By Mas-Colell (1985, 2.5.1, p.76),
Det(C) is nothing more than Gaussian curvature (assumed non-zero since U v
11
has no critical point) multiplied by a non-zero constant, and thus Det(A) 6=
0. Applying the implicit function theorem once again, the demand functions
implied by the bid rent calculation (9) are Cr. Plugging these solutions into the
denition of bid rent, we obtain that bid rent is Cr provided that commuting
cost is a Cr function of z.
Here there is a potential problem if rms using the same type of labor are
located on two di¤erent sides of a consumer, since in that case commuting cost
is continuous but not necessarily di¤erentiable in z. But if we restrict attention
to those allocations where rms using the same type of labor are connected
(as assumed) and using hyper-rectangles centered at !, as postulated at the
beginning of section 4.2, then commuting cost is Cr.
Finally, the assumptions that
8v 6= v0; 8p; wv; wv0 ; Cv; Cv0 ; uv; uv0 almost surely for z 2 Z n S[
s=1
Mvs[
i=1
Ci;vs
@v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv)
@z
6= @
v0(z; p; wv
0
; Cv
0
; uv
0
)
@z
and @(z;p;w;C;u)
@z
6= 0 (except at z = !) allow us to apply the implicit func-
tion theorem to locations z where v(z; p; wv; Cv; uv) = v
0
(z; p; wv
0
; Cv
0
; uv
0
)
or   (z; p; w; C; u) = 	, so that the implicit function parameterizing the in-
tersection of two consumers bid rents or a consumer bid rent with the producer
land price is Cr. Thus the equation system (16) (19) is Cr.
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An Example of a Regular Parameterization:
Let K = 1 and Z = [0; 1]. Using Walras law, we take (19) to be the
redundant equation in the system. We modify (16) (18) to incorporate the
following exogenous parameters, some of which are not yet in the system.
Already appearing in equation (16) only are N v (v = 1; :::; V ). We relax
the assumption that production functions for all rms using the same type of
labor to produce the same output are the same, and parameterize production
functions as follows. For i;vs > 0,
f i;vs (L
i;v
s ; (C
i;v
s );
i;v
s ) =
1
i;vs
f
i;v
s (L
i;v
s ) +
ef i;vs ((Ci;vs ))
where f
i;v
s is C
2 and df
i;v
s
dL
> 0 and d
2f
i;v
s
dL2
< 0. (This is easily generalized to
the case where f i;vs is not additively separable by using the implicit function
theorem in combination with the rst order conditions for prot maximization,
as in the proof of Lemma 1).
Finally, we replace the single landlord with two, where the rst landlord
receives % of rents plus prots and the second landlord receives (1  )% of
rents plus prots. (The rst landlord will be denoted by bars over variables
and the second landlord will be represented by tildes over variables.) Moreover,
we endow the landlords with consumption goods W , fW 2 <s++. Formally,
XL(R; ) = X
L
(R; ) W + eXL((1  )R; (1  )) fW
We claim that the parameterization
n
(N v)Vv=1 ;
 
i;vs
Mvs V S
i=1 v=1 s=1
;  ; W;fWo
is regular. To prove this, we examine the derivative of (16) (18) with re-
spect to the parameters (at equilibrium). The Jacobian of (16) with respect to
(N v)Vv=1 is the negative of the identity matrix, and N
v appears nowhere else in
the system. Turning next to the parameters i;vs and equation (17), notice that
from the rst order conditions for prot optimization, Li;vs = f
0i;v 1
s

i;vs w
v
ps

.
The Jacobian of (17) with respect to
 
i;vs
Mvs V S
i=1 v=1 s=1
yields a non-singular sub-
matrix of rank
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs . Notice that the Jacobian of (18) with respect to 
i;v
s
yields non-zero elements, but these can be row-eliminated.
The last part of the proof is similar to Mas-Colell (1985, Example 5.8.5,
p.227). For an arbitrary small change inW , we can compensate with a change
in  (for the rst landlord) andfW (for the second landlord) so that wealth, and
hence gross demand, is unchanged for both landlords. This yields a Jacobian
of (18) with respect to ;W and fW of rank s, and completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 2:
We need to ascertain the dimensions of the domain and range of the func-
tions given by the LHS of the equations (16)-(19). If we take one of the
consumption goods as the numéraire, the following tables describe the number
of unknowns and equations.
Unknown Dimension
p S   1
w V
u V
! 1
	 1
 1
Equation number Dimension
(16) V
(17)
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs
(18) S
(19) 1
Observe that one of the s commodity equations in (18) is dependent on the
other equations due to Walras law. After subtracting the number of equations
from the number of unknowns, we obtain: V  
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs + 2. In order to
apply the proposition of Mas-Colell (1985, proposition 8.3.1, p.320), we assume
that utilities, production functions and their parameterization (see Mas-Colell
(1985, denition 5.8.11, p.226)) are Cr with r > min(0; V  
SP
s=1
VP
v=1
M vs +2) and
Theorem 2 follows.
Proof of Theorem 3:
The proof proceeds in much the same way as the proof of Theorem 2.
Fix some symmetric order of rms. By symmetry, we limit attention to
[0; 1=2]  [0; 1]K 1. Fix ! = 1=2 so that it is no longer endogenous. (This
reduces the number of unknowns by 1.) For the rm in the middle of the order
(if any), called (i0; s0; v0), change its production function to ef v0s0 (Li0;v0s0 ; Qi0;v0s0 ) =
(1=2)  f v0s0 (2  Li
0;v0
s0 ; 2  Qi
0;v0
s0 ). Performing the same analysis contained in the
proof of Theorem 2 on this half-economy in [0; 1=2] [0; 1]K 1, with only rms
to the left of (i0; s0; v0) in the order participating and including the modied
middle rm (with the right endpoint of its parcel anchored at 1=2), we obtain
the result. Notice that when we add back the rms to the right of the middle
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rm, the equilibrium is unchanged by symmetry, and the middle rm can
return to its original production function without altering the allocation.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Let Z = [0; 1]K . Let rm (i; s; v) use the hyper-rectangle Ci;vs  [!h; !h+1]
[0; 1]K 1, where h =
P
s0<s
P
v0<v
M v
0
s0 + i. In this way, rms are always connected.
Fix ! the midpoint of rm land use, to be 1=2. As mentioned in section 4.2,
we must alter the rms problem (10) slightly to ensure that solutions exist.
Instead of asking them to solve (10) unconstrained, we impose the following
constraints, and dene vs(ps; w
v;	), Li;vs (ps; w
v;	) and Qi;vs (ps; w
v;	) to be
solutions to (10) subject to the following constraints:
0  Li;vs  N v + 1 (36)
0  Qi;vs  2 (37)
The solution to (10) subject to (36) and (37) always exists and is unique.
Dene u = [u1; :::; uV ] to be utility levels. For nonzero prices and utility
levels, the LHS of equations (16) (19) are continuous functions on 
  u
(see Lemma 1) - we will deal with the boundary cases momentarily - and are
respectively denoted by:
h1(p; w; u;	) = 0 (38)
h2(p; w; u;	) = 0 (39)
h3(p; w; u;	) = 0 (40)
h4(p; w; u;	) = 0 (41)
Let the domain of the prices (p, w and 	) be

 =
(
(p; w;	) j
SX
s=1
ps +
VX
v=1
wv +	 = 1; ps  0; wv  0;	  0; s = 1; :::; S; v = 1; :::; V
)
Due to the special nature of production, the asymptotic cones of the indi-
vidual production sets are positively semi-independent, so by Debreu (1959,
p.23(9)), the aggregate production set is closed. Given that the input endow-
ments of land and labor are bounded, the set of feasible allocations is compact.
Let the range of uv (when consumption is bounded by endowments) be con-
tained in [0; E   1]; where E 2 <+. In other words, when type v workers
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have all the resources, under equal treatment, they will all get exactly the
same utility level, which is at most E   1. Further, without loss of generality,
we assume that E is contained in the range of uv (when it is not constrained
by endowments). This eliminates one of the boundary problems mentioned
earlier.
The dual variables eu, ew, ep and e	 are respectively associated with equations
(16) (19) so that they maximize the following functions:
g1() = eu = argmax
u2[0;E]V
u  h1() (42)
g2() = (ep; ew; e	) = argmax
(p;w;e	)2
VX
v=1
wv 
SX
s=1
MvsX
i=1
h2() + p  h3() + e	  h4() (43)
We are left with dening g1 and g2 at boundary cases when bid rent is
undened. Whenever ps = 0, set qv = 0 so euv = E for all v, g2  fep; ew; e	 jewv = 0 8v; e	 = 0; P
fsjps=0g
eps = 1g. Whenever, uv = 0, set qv = 0 so eu = E,
ewv = 0, SP
s=1
eps = 1, e	 = 0.
g1() and g2() are convex valued and upper-hemicontinuous correspon-
dences. Let  be the Cartesian product of g1() and g2(). So  : EV  
 !
EV  
. Now, we have all the elements to apply the Kakutani xed point
theorem. Let the xed point be (bp; bw; bu; b	). The boundary conditions on both
the utility and the production functions will rule out the possibility of excess
demands. Next, let us demonstrate that at a xed point (bp; bw; bu; b	), h1(),
h2(), h3() and h4() are all equal to zero and hence we have an equilibrium.
First, let us focus on non-locational variables, where the argument is stan-
dard. Suppose that h2() for some rm (i; s; v), or h3() for some s, or h4() is
strictly positive. Then
VP
v=1
bwv  SP
s=1
MvsP
i=1
h2() + bp  h3() + b	  h4() > 0. Summing
the budget constraints of all consumers and the landlord/shareholder and us-
ing the denition of prot for rms, it must be that (43) is non-positive. This
contradicts the inequality above. Suppose that h2() for some rm (i; s; v),
or h3() for some s, or h4() is strictly negative. Using the summed budget
constraints and the denition of prot, some other components of h2(), h3(),
or h4() must be positive. This leads to another contradiction of the inequality
above.
So it remains to show that h1() = 0. If h1() > 0 for some v, then buv = E.
This implies that the allocation of goods is infeasible (since the maximum
utility attainable at a feasible allocation is E 1), contradicting what we have
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already proved. If h1() < 0 for some v, then buv = 0, and this cannot be a
xed point, since its image under g1 is E. So h1() = 0.
Finally, if for some rm (i; s; v) there is an alternative production plan that
yields higher prots than the xed point production plan, then this alternative
violates either (36) or (37). Since the xed point production plan is feasible and
the prot function is linear, there is a convex combination of the xed point
production and the alternative that yields higher prots than the xed point
production plan, satises (36) and (37), and (since the production function is
concave) can be produced. Since the xed point production plan solves (10)
subject to (36) and (37), this is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5:
The proof is the same as that of Theorem 4, as modied as in the proof of
Theorem 3 to use only a half-economy. Using symmetry, the equilibrium can
be extended to the entire economy.
Proof of Theorem 6:
To prove Theorem 6, we will nd a counter-example to the rst fundamental
theorem of welfare economies. Let us use Example 1. One equilibrium of
interest is when the two rms are located in the middle of [0; 1], i.e., z+1 =
z 2 = 1=2. We now nd a small Pareto improvement, denoted by tildes over
the variables. We give absentee landlords exactly the same allocation of goods
in the Pareto improvement as in equilibrium. Starting with the equilibrium
allocation, move the rms apart by 2" so that ez+1 = 1=2  " and ez 2 = 1=2+ ".
Let the rms use the same inputs including the same quantities of land in the
new allocation. In other words, ez 1 = z 1   " and ez+2 = z+2 + ". The rms
will produce the same outputs at the new allocation. A consumer located in
equilibrium at "  z  z 1 will get exactly the same allocation of goods but
will be located at ez = z   ", slightly to the left. Then this consumer will
have the same level of utility (and commuting cost) in this allocation as in the
equilibrium allocation. A consumer located in equilibrium at ez+2  z  1   "
will get exactly the same allocation of goods but will be located at ez = z + ",
slightly to the right. Then this consumer will have the same level of utility
(and commuting cost) in this allocation as in the equilibrium allocation. The
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consumers who were located at 0  z  " in equilibrium are moved to 1=2  z
and will have the same allocation of goods. The consumers who were located
at 1   "  z  1 in equilibrium are moved to 3=2   z and will have the
same allocation of goods. Notice that commuting cost for the last two types
of consumers will be lower in the new allocation, so that there will be some
surplus good 1 to distribute to any or all agents and raise utility. To be
more precise, the savings of these consumers in terms of commuting cost will
be
"R
0
n(z)t(z 1   ")dz +
1R
1 "
n(z)t(1   "   z+2 )dz (where n(z) is the equilibrium
population density), whereas the additional cost of transporting goods between
the two rms is 4". By choosing t large enough and  small enough, we
have constructed a feasible Pareto improvement. Hence, the initial equilibrium
was not Pareto optimal, and in particular was not an equal treatment Pareto
optimum.
Although we use the concept of equal treatment Pareto optimum for conve-
nience, notice that any equilibrium involves equal treatment (in utility levels)
of consumers of the same type. Consequently, for the counter-example to the
rst welfare theorem, showing that an equilibrium allocation is not an equal
treatment Pareto optimum is the same as showing that it is not a Pareto
optimum.
Observe that in this example, locating rms at opposite ends of the unit
interval (maximum di¤erentiation) is not Pareto optimal. Indeed, at such an
allocation, the social planner can ip the allocation between zero and one-
half symmetrically about one-quarter, and ip the allocation between one-half
and one symmetrically about three-quarters to obtain a Pareto dominating
allocation; the allocation of goods is unchanged except rm transportation
costs are reduced and these goods are reallocated to consumers.
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